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Technicians prefer to avoid discussion of the moral basis of
their professional work. It is all too likely to reveal funda-
memtal differences within the profession, where it does not reveal
complete lack of concern or absence of thought. The professional
de'lopment planner finds it more difficult than most other prof-
essionals to evade the moral basis of his role, since his work so
obviously is related to fundamental decisions about the objectives
of a society.
I am here concerned with the role of the technician in devel-
opment planning, whether he be f oreìgn or indigenous, not the
poittical role of the same individual. The distinction between
the role of the technician and the sane person in his political
role is, to my mind, much greater than the difference between
foreign and indigenous technicians. I am not suggesting that the
technician is absolved from all moral judgment, but that the
principal moral question which he faces is whether to work for a
particular government or not, As a technician or professional,
an individual can work for a government because he feels that his
objectives are shared to a significant degree by that government
and vorking for it can achieve the shared objectives more eff i-
ciaotly, At the same time, he can regard the government as far
from ideal and in his political role would like to see it replaced
by one with which he shares a wider range cf objectives.
An example may help. An Indian economist, if he is a soci-
alist, may vote for a sociaJist party, contribute to it and, as a
citizen, work to have it replace the Congress Party government,
because he shares the objectives of that socialist party. However,
he may share enough of the objectives of the Congress Party and may
regard it as providing a morally acceptable government and may
therrefore be willing to work for a Congress government in a techni-
cal role, Another example would be the foreigner who accepts a
professional role in a government whose objective of achieving
higher growth he shares, but who would not advocate increased aid
to that government when he returns home, since he regards an
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alternative government as preferable. The rather narrow moral
issue which the technician has to decide is the extent to which
his objectives and those of the government have to be similar before
he is prepared to lend his professional talent to that government,
Iii his political role he has to decide as well whether to support
that government in the political arena.
Once a professional economist has decided to work for a
government, it has been widely assumed that one of the most serious
problems he encounters is a decision on the objective function which
the planning agency is trying to maximize The difficulty is
supposed to arise especially with respect to the trade-off between
growth and equity. While this is an important and difficult issue,
there are three reasons why its significance is often overstated,
First of all, many governments have clearly opted for the
primacy of one of these objectives over the other, Therefore, the
only question which the technician faces is whether he should help
the government achieve the objective function which it h5 clearly
set for itself or not, Practically, every government would, of
course, claim that it wants to achieve both growth and equity and
the claim may well be genuine, However, the actions which govern-
ments have taken and are prepared to take often demonstrate quite
clearly whether they are in fact prepared to sacrifice growth to
any significant degree in order to achieve equity, or vice versa.
Most governments pay lip service to both objectives, but they have
given overwhelming weight to one or the other. The technician,
the economist, or planner really is not faced with the question of
how to weigh these two objectives, since the government has given
him a clear answer.
In Burma, for instance, equity has been defined principally
with respect to the economic relationship between Burmese and
non-Burmese (primarily Indians and Pakistanis) and the government
clearly has opted for the primacy of equity. It is prepared to
tolerate even a decline in per capita income in order to achieve
Burmese control of the economy. It is difficult to conceive of
an economist or planner, whether Burmese or foreign, who is likely
to have any profound impact on that decision. The sane thing
would be true of Cuba, or of Sukarno's Indonesia or of Tanzania,
It is difficult to conceive of an economist, whether Cuban or
foreign, saying to the Cuban government: what you have done has
obviously had bad consequences for growth; you ought really to
re-introduce foreign investment and pay the cane cutters by the
amount of cane they produce, and then you can get a higher rate
of growth. It is an implausible picture. On the other hand, in
Pakistan, or Thailand, or the Philippines governments nay have
stressed the importance of equity, but the actions that have been
taken made clear the primacy of growth, In Pakistan, the govern-
ment stressed, for instance, the importance of equal economic
development in East and West Pistan, but there were powerful
vested interests pressing for greater allocation to West Pakistan,
and technicians inevitably had little influence on allocation
between the Provinces, Given the political forces in most
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countries, an economist can participate effectively in decision-
making only if he accepts the principal objective of the government
and helps the government to implement it more efficiently,
In all countries there are some gray areas, areas of uncertainty,
where powerful, clear-cut interests are not involved, where a trade-
off nay be possible between growth and equity and where the political
leadership of the country nay pay attention to the views of the
technicians. But normally this gray area is relatively limited.
There may also be a few instances where the issue really has not been
decided. An outstanding example is Malaysia. One group argues
strongly for the primacy of growth, since all social problems will
be aggravated by increasing unemployment which would result from a
lower growth rate. Another group suggests that what really matters
is a more equitable distribution of the fruits of the economy
between Malays and Chinese. In that kind of situation, the views
of the technician-economist on the costs and benefits of the altern-
atives might make a difference, but these are the exceptions.
Generally, the conflict between growth and equity, or more broadly
the construction of an objective function is not as difficult as
sometimes assumed, because goals are clearly revealed by the poli-
tical leadership.
Secondly, the politically set objectives are very often quite
defensible in moral terms, so that most technicians can accept them
without too many qualms. This is the result in part of the tendency
for the politically determined objectives to reflect the failures
of past policy, When an economy has achieved rapid growth and a
reasonably high level of per capita income, accompanied by very
unequal distribution of income and wealth, the political leadership
tends to give emphasis to equity. Cuba, Peru, East Africa are
outstanding examples. On the other hand, countries that have
experienced stagnation in per capita income, especially it' that
stagnation was in part the consequence of unsuccessful government
intervention in the economy in order to achieve equity, tend to
emphasize growth. This was true of Pakistan in 1959, of Ghana
after the overthrow of Iikrumah and of Indonesia after the over-
throw of Suicarno. It is not surprising that governments often
respond only to a failure of a previous set of policies. Govern-
ments very rarely deal with projected prospective problems. For
instance, less developed countries are naturally reluctant to focus
on problems of the environment and ecology, just as they rarely
focus on equity, when they have failed to achieve growth and vice
versa.
The third reason why the decision on an objective function
may not be too difficult is that there often is mo substantial and
direct conflict between growth and equity once the general political-
economic framework has been decided, be it a mixed, or capitalist,
or socialist economy,
An example can be drawn from one of the many mixed economies
where ownership is primarily private, but the government plans and
intervenes substantially, though primarily, through fiscal, monetary
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and commercial policy. Such economies are often acknowledged to
be favourable to growth, but criticized as unfavourable to equity.
generally, three factors determine whether a more equitable distri-
bution of income is achieved within the political and economic
framework of such a society. First, whether it is possible to reduce
the price of wage goods or goods of mass consumption, which often
largely determine the real wages of all who sell their labour.
In a labour surplus economy their money wages tend to change very
slowly, and their real income may be determined much more by the
prices of the food and cloth they buy than by wage increases. The
second major way in which inequality can be reduced is by a reduc-
tion in the number of unemployed. Usually, the biggest difference
in real income is between those who have a steady job and those who
do not, and providing jobs reduces what is often the most serious
inequity in many societies. The third step is to tax the consump-
tion of the rich.
Policies to reduce the price of wage goods, increase jobs and
tax the consumption of upper-income groups generally not only improve
equity but also are desirable for growth. Policies to expand the
use of water, fertiliser and new technology in agriculture are
obviously highly desirable for growth. They may benefit primarily
the larger cultivators and therefore be unfavourable for one aspect
of equity. At the same time, however, greater output will improve
equity through lower prices for wage goods and this effect may be
dominant, so that both growth and equity objectives are net by
policies to increase agricultural output. Similarly, it is
usually true that the only way in which employment can be increased
significantly is to step up the rate of growth, since relatively
little can be done by way of changing the factor proportions. To
tax the consumption of the rich and thereby increase the attractive-
ness of savings is desirable for growth as well as equity.
In mixed economies steps other than these three which are
supposedly designed for equity reasons very often do harm growth,
but do not really advance equity. They simply benefit the poli-
tically powerful middle-income groups, given a situation where
influence, bribery, and political pressure are effective, There
are many examples. Minimum wages for workers almost inevitably
are limited to industrial workers In large plants who already form
a middle class group (and sometimes not even lower middle class)
in societies where the industrial labour force is small and where
the really poor are the casual workers, landless labourers and the
unemployed, The really poor may actually suffer in a labour
surplus economy, as minimum wages for sri elite group of workers
reduce the number of jobs created, Fertiliser, water, and import
licenses are sometimes allocated by government in order to assure
equity by favouring smaller firms and farms. But given the fact
that the rich arid well organized are in a better position to
influence government decisions, these steps very rarely do much to
redress the unequal distribution of income. They may benefit the
middle class at the cost of the rich, but they very rarely benefit
the really poor.
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There remains a basic question. I have suggested that once
the technician accepts the economic system which the political
machinery has produced, the conflict between growth and equity is
often not a very serious one. But should the technician accept the
system? If he contributes by his technical competence to improve
the efficiency of the system, does he strengthen the status quo and
simply delay a change in the f rainework which would mean either
greater equity or growth, or perhaps both? Does the technician
who accepts the capitalist or mixed system in Pakistan strengthen
that system and thus helps to prevent a more radical change which
would maintain growth and improve equity? Does the technician who
works in Cuba or Guinea and improves the efficiency of that system,
prevent reforms which could bring about both higher growth and
greater freedom? Therefore, is the technician justified in accepting
a political-economic framework with which he disagrees and thus
provide support for its perpetuation? Does he in fact make a moral
decision by working with governments and accepting their politically
set goals?
It is quite possible that under some circuintances a technician
who improves the efficiency of a system delays a fundamental change
to a framework he would regard as far superior. But there are
several questions that have to be asked before one can be sure that
such is the case in many circumatances. First of all, it is very
unclear whether greater economic efficiency which results in a
higher growth rate is more likely to have a stabilising or de-
stabilising effect on the political system, that is, whether
stagnant or rapidly changing economies are more likely to result in
political change. Therefore, the technician who wants to see a
change in the basic political-economic framework may want to assist
a country in achieving a higher rate of growth.
The second question to which the answer is very unclear is
whether a radical change in the political-economic framework of
most countries is likely to lead to an improvement for the mass of
the people or a deterioration. Obviously, radical political
change can lead to improvement. If one looks around the countries
of this world, most economies are really a sad caricature of their
potential for creating human welfare. So it is not difficult, for
almost any country in the world, to conceive that the economy could
be better managed. The issue is whether a radical change in the
economic and political framework of most less developed countries
is likely to be a change foiS the better, given the actual distri-
bution of power in those countries. Comparing the countries that
have opted for a high degree of equity - such as Burma, Indonesia
during the Sukarno period, Ghana during the Nkruinah period, or
Guinea - with India or Pakistan, or Ghana and Indonesia at present
it is not at all clear in which of these countries at what time the
great mass of people have been better off, It is similarly not
obvious which system is better for most people - Cuba's or
Venezuela's or Costa Rica's, Chile's or Iraq's or Iran's.
Even more complex is the case of Brazil. Would the great mass of
Brazilians have been better or worse off if there had been fewer
economic difficulties a decade ago, and hence fewer reasons for a
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military take-over, and instead there had been a continuation of
the mixed economy and somewhat muddled government that existed
earlier? As in the case of all such questions in the social
sciences, there is no answer because there is no way of testing
alternatives. But this kind of comparison suggests that some degree
of humility is called for on the part of technicians, professionals,
economists, and planners in deciding whether or not to work for a
government that is not ideal. Can one confidently say that any
government which does not aim to achieve both growth and equity is
a government not worth working with, because the technician only
helps to postpone the desirable and inevitable change to a system
which will almost certainly be far superior and in which both
objectives are likely to be achieved?
I have not really answered the basic moral questions which
every professional must ultimately face. Pirst, whether he should
serve a particular government that opts for a particular weighting
of objectives. Secondly, once he works for that government and
finds that there is some small geay area in which his views carry
some weight, how hard he should push and what objectives he should
push for, keeping in mind the risk that strong advocacy may end his
employment and usefulness? Thirdly, at what point should he say
that the gray area has become too small or the objectives of the
government differ too much from his own and therefore he must resign.
I have not really answered these questions because I do not think
any one can answer fundamental moral questions except for himself.
All I have done is to suggest that the determination of the objective
function which is to be maximized by a model or plan is very often
not as crucial for the technicians as has been suggested in the
literature, and that the role of the professional in decisions on
the relative weight to be given to growth as against equity is a
limited one.
